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Abstract
The vision, strategies, and goals of enterprises involve numerous security issues; these stem from legal and business concerns.
In turn, these goals are realized by the enterprise, organized into business groups, departments, divisions, etc. For example, a
financial organization, such as a bank, needs to provide a range of services to their customers including private banking, commercial
banking, international banking, and investment services. These services are provided by sub-organizations in the enterprise (i.e.,
the enterprise architecture); the sub-organizations are often partitioned along the business lines. For example, one sub-organization
is responsible for private banking, another for commercial banking, etc. When providing financial services, there is a need to ensure
that customer and account data are kept private, not corrupted, and safely backed up. Some of these needs may be realized in a
collection of software applications. The problem of effectively designing secure software systems to meet an organization’s needs
is a critical part of their success. This paper focuses on the problem of how to bridge the gap between enterprise and software
architectures for security using a set of UML based notations: the Business Modeling Extension for UML, standard UML use
case diagrams, and the Formal Design Analysis Framework (FDAF). The Business Modeling Extension and standard UML are
established approaches we adopt in this work. FDAF is an aspect-oriented approach that supports the design and analysis of non-
functional properties for distributed, real-time systems at the software architecture level. An empirical study for an online banking
system is used to illustrate the approach.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The vision, goals, and strategies of enterprises involve numerous security issues, stemming from legal, business,
and social concerns. For example, a financial enterprise, such as a bank, needs to ensure that employee and customer
data are kept private, account balances for customers are not corrupted, information in the system are safely backed
up, accounts can only be accessed by authorized people, etc. The importance of the problem to enterprises can be seen
from the number of security incidents reported to the Computer Emergency Readiness Team Coordination Center
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(CERT/CC) and their associated costs. The CERT/CC data from 2003 reports 137,529 incidents; the cost of electronic
crimes is reported at $666 million [7]. Most of these incidents, which can involve from one to thousands of sites, result
from software vulnerabilities. The CERT/CC data indicate the number of these incidents continues to rise.
In this work, we focus on the problem of how to bridge the gap between enterprise and early software models
(requirements and architecture) to help meet an enterprise’s security goals. Earlier work [11] is extended by providing
a more comprehensive example that includes visual models of the enterprise goals and includes a survey of related
work. The approach is illustrated by building Role-Based Access Control into the software architecture for an online
banking system. A combination of UML based approaches has been selected to model the multiple levels of artifacts.
A UML business modeling extension [13] is used to model the business goals; UML use cases are used for the software
requirements [31]. The Formal Design Analysis Framework (FDAF) [10], also UML based, has been selected for the
software architecture. These approaches are discussed in Section 2. Many alternative approaches are available for
modelling early requirements including KAOS [12], Tropos [16], and the NFR Framework [5]. In addition, other
approaches specifically tailored for enterprise process modelling such as IDEF0 [21] are available. In this work, we
select UML based notations to reduce the number of different notations used to illustrate the use of FDAF to bridge the
gap between the enterprise architecture and the software architecture. However, we recognize that other approaches
could also be used.
As security properties and security patterns are key features in FDAF, here, we briefly introduce the aspectual, or
crosscutting, nature of security properties and discuss security patterns. Security properties are pervasive properties of
an application, as it is difficult to encapsulate many security properties into one part of the design. Such properties are
referred as crosscutting properties. The new design discipline, Aspect-oriented software development (AOSD) [14],
has been considered as a suitable solution to address the design of crosscutting concerns. AOSD is the adaptation
of aspect-oriented programming principles to the design phase. Aspect-oriented programming techniques provide
linguistic mechanisms for separate expression of concerns (e.g., stakeholders’ interests), along with implementation
technologies for weaving these separate concerns into working systems. In AOSD, a system’s tangling concerns (e.g.,
non-functional properties) are encapsulated in model element called an aspect. Subsequently, a weaving process is
employed to compose core functionality model elements (those realize the system’s main functionalities) with these
aspects, thereby generating a complete architecture design.
A security pattern [34] describes a recurring security problem that arises in specific contexts and presents well-
proven generic schemes as solutions, thus key security problems are identified for novices and security problems are
solved in a structured way. Further, a security pattern enables security experts to identify, name, and discuss both
problems and solutions more efficiently. However, the limitations of security patterns include: (1) security patterns
are mainly described in text (i.e., English), which are disconnected from design notations that system architects might
actually use (i.e., UML) and makes them relatively hard to use as input in current security analysis tools and (2) the
use of security mechanism in a security pattern, such as where and when to call the given security mechanism in an
application, has not been addressed adequately.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an approach to bridge the gap between
enterprise and early software models. Section 3 presents the RBAC security pattern and security aspect. An illustration
of modeling the RBAC security aspect for the example system, an online banking system, is presented in Section 4
and is discussed in Section 5. Related work is presented in Section 6. Conclusions and future work are presented in
Section 7.
2. Enterprise and early software models
2.1. Overview
One way to view the enterprise architecture models and the relationships to early software models is presented
in Fig. 1. The enterprise architecture represents the organizational and behavioral structure of the business system;
four views of the architecture have been proposed (vision, structure, process, and behavior) [13]. The vision describes
the organization’s goals that will move (part of) the enterprise from where it is now to where the stakeholders want
it to be. For example, a financial enterprise may have a single, high level goal such as “to be the top performing
financial services company in North America” [3], which is decomposed into a collection of sub-goals. The goals are
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Fig. 1. An overview of enterprise and early software models.
generally combinations of functional and non-functional (e.g., security, performance, etc.) goals.1 The challenges in
accomplishing this include the involvement of numerous, diverse stakeholders with different needs from parts of the
enterprise, or sub-enterprises, such as geographically distributed business groups, departments or divisions. Part of the
difficulty in achieving this for security requirements stems from the breadth of the problem, as security covers many
areas (authentication, auditing, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation as in security standard
ISO 7498-2 [22]) and involves legal, business, and social issues [1].
These goals are accomplished by interacting sub-organizations, or sub-enterprises, in a business [20]. For example,
a financial institution may be structured into business groups such as private banking, commercial banking, global
banking, investment management, insurance, etc. Each sub-enterprise is responsible for meeting a set of business
goals, using combinations of manual and automated workflow processes (refer to Fig. 1). The need for more efficient,
automated, improved processes often drives the development or purchase of new or modified software systems. As
it is not feasible to automate every workflow, specific goals are selected for realization in a software system, which
could be built in-house, outsourced, or purchased. The sub-enterprise’s goals are refined into software requirements;
a software architecture is designed to realize the software requirements. Subsequent software engineering activities
include defining the detailed design model, implementing, and testing the system.
1 A variety of notations are available to model goals. In Fig. 1, an oval is used to represent multiple kinds of goals (functional, non-functional) at
the enterprise level.
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Fig. 2. Metamodel of business modeling concepts.
2.2. Business models
A business modeling extension for UML has been defined which provides additional concepts necessary to model
a business system [13]. These concepts include goals, processes, resources, and rules. Goals describe the purpose of
the business, or what the business is trying to accomplish. Processes are the activities performed within the business;
these can be manual or automated processes. The processes are performed to achieve, or realize, goals. Resources
include people, material, information, organizations, products used and products produced by the enterprise. Rules
define or constrain some aspect of a business, such as how or when a process can be performed. The extension has a
defined metamodel, which defines the relationships among the concepts [13]. An adapted version of the metamodel is
illustrated in Fig. 2, in which we simplify some parts of the metamodel (e.g., the three kinds of rules are not illustrated
— constraint, derivation, existence) and add the two kinds of processes (manual and automated). Note that a goal is a
central concept in the metamodel.
The extension supports four different views of an enterprise architecture: vision, structure, process, and behavior.
The business vision and structure views are static; the process and behavior views are dynamic. The business vision
describes the goals for the company and problems that must be solved to accomplish the goals. A goal/problem
diagram is used to model the goals and problems with an object collaboration diagram. The goal objects are either
qualitative or quantitative goals; the goals can be decomposed into sub-goals in an AND decomposition relationship,
defined with the constraint {complete}. The problems are stereotyped UML notes, <<problem>>. The business
structure describes the organization of the company as interacting sub-enterprises with class and object diagrams. The
class diagrams show the principle structure; the object diagrams show how the enterprise looks at a specific point in
time. The sub-enterprises are responsible for accomplishing business goals; this is done using processes. The business
process and behavior views describe the activities performed in the business to accomplish goals and the individual
behavior of a process respectively; these are modeled with activity and statechart diagrams.
In this work, we focus on the vision, or goal model, in the enterprise architecture and their relationships to the
software models. We believe the goal model is a key view of the enterprise architecture, as other concepts in the
metamodel are all related to the goal. In addition, goal-oriented software engineering techniques have been proposed
and successfully applied in examples and case studies; it seems feasible to use goal-oriented approaches to bridge the
gap between the enterprise and software models.
2.3. Software requirements and architecture
2.3.1. Goal and use case models
Early in the software requirements engineering process, a goal model can also be used to capture the objectives
of the system. These goals can be decomposed and refined as its purpose and capabilities become clearer. As noted
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Fig. 3. Metamodel of use case [31].
earlier, there are many alternative approaches available for modelling early requirements including KAOS [12], Tropos
[16], and the NFR Framework [5]. Here, we propose using the goal/problem model to capture the software goals. This
reduces the number of different notations used and provides a common UML based notation that crosses the enterprise
and software model boundaries.
A use case model is an established approach for capturing software requirements [23]; a model is described with a
collection of Use Case Diagrams. The Use Case Diagram is a behavioral diagram defined in UML [31] that allows the
visualization of capabilities of the system and the actors (people or external systems) that interact with them. Each use
case is represented with an oval; actors are represented with a stick figure, and interactions are represented using lines
or arrows. A use case can be defined to extend the behavior of another use case (i.e., add some additional behavior).
Common behavior can be placed into a separate use case to modularize the behavior; other use cases may be defined
to include the common behavior. Use cases are described in more detail using textual descriptions, that include an
overview, pre- and post-conditions, normal flow of events, alternate flow of events, and special (i.e., non-functional)
requirements. A simplified metamodel for the use case, adapted from [31], is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Use case models have been gaining popularity, as they have been incorporated into the popular Rational Unified
Process [26], a software development process that is on its way to becoming a de facto standard in the software
engineering community [32]. A number of goal-driven approaches have been proposed that refine a goal model and
transform it into a use case model. Once the use case model is available, established object-oriented analysis and
design approaches can be used to define a software architecture and capture it in standard UML; techniques are under
investigation to improve the transformation of requirements into an architecture (refer to Section 6).
2.3.2. FDAF software architecture models
FDAF is an aspect-oriented architectural framework that supports the systematic modeling and automated analysis
of non-functional properties, including security, using a combination of an extended UML and a set of existing formal
methods. In FDAF, reusable security aspects are defined in UML; they are derived from security patterns. FDAF
aspect definition provides concrete information regarding the use of security aspects, including explicit definition of
attributes and aspect operations for realizing the security mechanisms (i.e., the interactions between the aspect and
the application the aspect is woven into). A detailed survey of related approaches used to design and analyze security
properties, including [4,28], is available in [10].
An overview of FDAF is presented in Fig. 4. Users of FDAF include a variety of stakeholders, such as architects,
designers, requirement engineers etc. The inputs of the framework are entities used by the stakeholders, including a
system design documented in the UML and a requirement specification that includes the system’s functional and non-
functional requirements. The outputs of the framework are entities produced by the stakeholders, including a baselined
UML design model, a set of formal aspect design models and the analysis results produced by formal analysis tools.
In FDAF, non-functional properties (e.g., performance, security, reliability, etc.) are represented as aspects in an
architecture design. FDAF provides an aspect repository, where a collection of predefined aspects are available for
architects to reuse. Architects can search the repository to select the appropriate aspect(s) according to the system’s
non-functional requirements. FDAF supports the definition for data origin authentication, role-based access control,
and log for audit security aspects. The aspects are represented with an aspect-oriented UML extension. This is achieved
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Fig. 4. Formal design analysis framework.
by abstracting aspect-oriented implementation constructs, e.g., join points, advice, up to the design level. The syntax
and semantics of the extension are defined in [10].
Once an aspect is captured in a UML based architecture design, FDAF uses a set of existing formal analysis
tools to automatically analyze the extended design. The automated analysis of an extended UML architecture design
in existing formal analysis tools is achieved by formalizing part of UML into a set of formal languages that have
tool support. The translation into formal languages leverages a large body of work in the research community. The
formalization approach used is the translational semantic approach [18]. In translational semantics, models specified
in one language are given a semantics by defining a mapping to a simpler language, or a language which is better
understood. Algorithms for mapping (part of) UML to a set of formal languages have been defined, verified with
proofs, and implemented in FDAF tool support, thus automated translation from UML to the set of formal languages
are realized. The set of formal languages that UML can be formalized into include: Rapide ADL [29], Armani ADL
[30], Æmilia ADL [2], Promela [19], and Alloy [35]. Each formal language has its own architectural modeling
concentration (e.g., architectural connections, architectural constraints etc.), its syntax is considerably simpler and
its semantics are well understood. Rapide ADL’s analysis tool is used to analyze response time aspect design; Armani
ADL’s analysis tool is used to analyze resource utilization aspect design; Æmilia ADL’s analysis tool is used to analyze
throughput aspect design; Promela’s analysis tool is used to analyze data origin authentication and log for audit aspect
design; and Alloy’s analysis tool is used to analyze role-based access control aspect design, where the consistency
of role-based access policies can be enforced. The translation of FDAF’s extended UML notation into Rapide ADL,
Armani ADL, Æmilia ADL, Promela, and Alloy has been documented in [10]. The potential benefits of architecture
level analysis work are substantial: design flaws can be detected and removed earlier in the software development
lifecycle. This reduces development time, reduces development cost, and improves the quality of the resulting system.
An application of using FDAF to analyze response time for security aspects at the architecture level is available in [9].
FDAF’s UML aspect-oriented modeling extension is defined within the package called Aspect-Oriented Modeling
(AOM) Foundation. The package defines the basic metamodel constructs needed for the development of aspect-
oriented models. Fig. 5 illustrates the relationships between the AOM Foundation package and the UML Foundation
packages. The AOM foundation package is decomposed into two sub packages called AOM Data Types and AOM
Core package. The AOM Data Types package defines basic data types for aspect-oriented modeling, including
AdviceType, CrosscuttingType, PCOperatorType, and PointcutType, where AdviceType denotes the type of Advice,
before, after or around; CrosscuttingType denotes the type of Crosscutting relationship between an Operation and
a Joinpoint (represented in a Pointcut); PCOperatorType denotes the operator used to Pointcuts; and PointcutType
denotes the type of a Pointcut, such as call, execute, etc.
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Fig. 5. High level package view of the UML extension for aspect-oriented modeling.
Fig. 6. Aspect-oriented modeling core package.
The AOM Core package specifies the basic AOM constructs necessary to model aspect-oriented design,
as presented in Fig. 6. The extended AOM design model elements include ReuseAspect, Joinpoint, Pointcut,
PC Operator, Crosscutting, and Advice. A brief description of these model elements are: ReuseAspect represents
a predefined substantive aspect in FDAF aspect repository; Joinpoint allows architects to identify a well-defined
execution point (e.g., operations) of a system in the design; Pointcut allows architects to wrap identified Joinpoints
at the design level; PC Operator allows architects to represent the relationship between Pointcuts; Crosscutting
represents the modifying relationship between aspect operation(s) (defined in a ReuseAspect) and a UML operation;
and Advice allows architects to express crosscutting rules.
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Table 1
Role-based access control security pattern
Pattern name Role-based access control
Abstract Role-based access control specifies the control access to resources based only on the role of the subject.
Problem Permissions for subjects accessing protected objects have to be described in a suitable way. A central authority should be
responsible for granting the authorizations. A convenient administration of the authorizations should be guaranteed for a
large number of subjects and objects.
Solution Four concepts: user, role, right, and object. User and Role describe the registered users and the predefined roles, respectively.
Users are assigned to roles, roles are given rights according to their functions. The association class Right defines the access
types that a user within a role is authorized to apply to the protection object.
3. Role-based access control aspect
Access is the ability to do something with a computer resource (e.g., use, change, or view). Access control is the
means by which the ability is explicitly enabled or restricted in some way (usually through physical and system-based
controls). The RBAC model, as introduced in 1992 by Ferraiolo and Kuhn, has become the predominant model for
advanced access control because it reduces the complexity and cost of security administration in large networked
applications. The RBAC model is defined in terms of individual users being assigned to roles and permissions being
assigned to roles. The benefits of RBAC include: low maintenance cost, increased efficiency, improved operational
performance, reduced IT service, and administrative costs both internally and externally.
The RBAC security pattern [34] is defined as a reusable aspect in FDAF. The definition of a security aspect
definition may include a static view and a dynamic view: the static view of the aspect is captured in UML class
diagram, where attributes and operations to realize the aspect capability are defined; the dynamic view of the aspect is
captured in UML sequence diagram, where the execution behavior of the aspect is illustrated. Generally, the security
pattern template [34] used to describe a security pattern includes these sections: name, abstract, problem, solution,
issues, etc. Pattern adapting in FDAF focuses on adapting name, problem, and solution sections to aspect definitions:
the name of a security pattern is adapted as the name of an aspect; entities (or participants) involved in the pattern are
identified as attributes of the aspect; operations on those entities are identified as operations of the aspect; and finally,
the pattern problem section can help identify the scenarios where the adapted aspect can be applied. With attributes
and operations, the static view of an aspect is obtained. If there is any constraint on execution order among aspect
operations or some of these operations need to be executed under certain condition, then a dynamic view of the aspect
is necessary. This section presents the RBAC security pattern, followed by the definition of the RBAC aspect.
Role-based access control security pattern. The RBAC security pattern is presented in Table 1. The pattern is
adapted from [34].
Role-based access control security aspect. Based on the solution provided by the RBAC security pattern, a static
view of the RBAC in UML class diagram aspect is presented in Fig. 7. In FDAF, a parallelogram notation is used
to present aspect information. The definition of the RBAC aspect includes five operations to manipulate the RBAC
concepts as defined in the RBAC security pattern: user, role, object, and right. Considering that in an access control
environment, user, object and right may already exist in the system, the entity role has been identified as an attribute
for the RBAC aspect. The operations of the RBAC aspect are:
 CreateRoleSession(): create a role session for users when they log in
 AssignRoles(): assign roles to users
 AssignRights(): assign rights to roles
 CheckRolesForActions(): verify whether a user with particular roles is authorized to take the actions or not
 DisableRoles(): disable roles.
4. Illustration: Online banking system
This section illustrates the enterprise goal and structure models, the software requirements, and software
architecture for an online banking system and the traceability relationships among the models. The FDAF approach
is used to weave the RBAC security aspect into the system’s architecture design.
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Fig. 7. Role-based access control aspect.
Fig. 8. Goal/problem diagram example for a (fictitious) financial services company.
4.1. Bank’s enterprise goal
An example of a Bank’s enterprise goals is provided here using the goal/problem diagram provided in the Business
Modeling Extension for UML [13] (refer to Fig. 8). The top level goal (a goal for a real financial institution)
is decomposed into a set of four qualitative sub-goals created for this example; all need to be accomplished to
achieve the top goal. The financial institution envisions that it needs to be the most diversified, have the largest asset
base and highest shareholder profitability, and be widely recognized as the investment company of choice in North
America. The diversification goal is decomposed into the goal to excel in four financial areas: commercial banking,
consumer banking, global banking, and investment services. The consumer banking services is further decomposed in
a collection of quantitative goals, which include increasing the number of customers in specific demographic groups
and increasing the number of customers using online and telephone banking services. In this example, we assume the
existing online system is over 15 years old, has some serious problems (e.g., not easy to use), and is nearing retirement.
Also, because of highly publicized security breaches of other web based systems and the knowledge that the current
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Fig. 9. Software goal/problem diagram for a (fictitious) financial services company.
system was not designed with security as a top priority, the business decides to build a new software application that
has improved capabilities including security, scalability, ease of use, etc.
4.2. Online banking software requirements
4.2.1. Software goal model
The goal to “Develop new secure, easy to use, scalable online banking system” needs to be decomposed and
refined into a software goal model. Here, we use the same goal/problem diagram to model the decomposition (refer
to Fig. 9). The decomposition includes both functional (e.g., system provides bank account management capabilities)
and non-functional (e.g. system is very secure) goals. These goals are decomposed and refined even further. For
example, the security goal has sub-goals for logging, authentication, privacy, and access control. The functional goal
to provide bank account management capabilities has sub-goals for creating a new account, viewing the account,
deleting an account, updating customer data, transferring funds between account, ordering new checks, reversing
fees, and freezing/activating accounts (these are not shown in Fig. 9).
4.2.2. Online banking software use case model
A use case model for the online banking system is partially illustrated in Fig. 10. The model is organized into
packages: system account management, bank account management, personal loans, and e-bill payment. Four actors
have been identified for the online system: customers, bank service representatives, bank managers, and system
administrators. Each actor can only access a specific set of functionality (i.e., role base access control). For example,
only a Bank Manager is allowed to reverse service fees charged on a bank account but three roles (Customer, Bank
Service Representative, and Bank Manager) are allowed to update customer data for a bank account. The graphic use
case diagram captures this information (which role can interact with which use case). Other security requirements,
however, need to be captured in the special requirements section of the textual description of the use case (refer to the
Appendix for an example of a textual description for the Update Customer Account Data Use Case). For example, the
special requirements for the Update Customer Account Data use case are:
Special requirements:
1. Online banking system is a web based application
2. Every online banking transaction request is logged
3. Every access violation is logged
4. The Customer Data are stored in a relational database
5. The logged events are stored in a separate relational database; the log data are encrypted for privacy.
Many of the security requirements crosscut a set of use cases, making them difficult to maintain as the requirements
change.
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Fig. 10. Use case model example for financial company’s online system.
Fig. 11. Online banking system architecture design without RBAC.
4.3. Online banking software architecture
Phase one: Online banking system without RBAC security aspect. In this phase, we designed the online banking
system to meet its software requirements. The architecture design (a simplified version, tailored for the paper)
is presented in Fig. 11. The architecture style selected is the Client–Server style. The architecture includes 13
components. The Banking Servlet component provides services to interact with users: get requests and post responses.
The Controller component connects to the bank database, authorizes users’ login, and deals with users’ requests.
According to the request from users, the Controller component creates a user session for the user and invokes the
appropriate action. These actions are represented in individual components, for example, view account balance (i.e.,
Account Balance Component), transfer fund (i.e., Fund Transfer Component), etc. All these actions are inherited
from one single parent, the Command component. Here, the design uses the idea from the command design pattern
[15]. The objects (e.g., accounts) of these actions are stored in the bank database and they are not presented in the
architecture. Users may request for actions on objects; however, only if a user is eligible for the requested action, the
action can be performed. For example, if a customer requests for Add Account action, this should be not allowed,
as only Bank Manager can perform the action. Without RBAC, this type of authorization checking is done on an
individual user basis.
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Fig. 12. Online banking system architecture design with RBAC.
Phase two: Online banking system with RBAC security aspect. In this phase, we enforced the RBAC feature into
the system (created in the first phase). The woven architecture design is presented in Fig. 12, where some operations
in the base architecture design (i.e., from Fig. 11) are “connected” with RBAC aspect operations using a solid line.
For example, the operation loginVerify(. . . ) is connected with three aspect operations CreateRoleSession(. . . ),
AssignRoles(. . . ), and AssignRights(. . . ); and the operation execute(. . . ) of the Command on component is
“connected” with the aspect operation CheckRolesForActions(). Aspect operations are presented in a parallelogram
notation.
In this phase, with the RBAC aspect enforced, every time after a user logs in, a role session for the user should
be created, subsequently, roles for the user (e.g., Customer, Bank Service Representative, Bank Manager, and System
Administrator) and rights for those roles are assigned. This means that the system should perform some additional
actions (or capabilities) after the execution of the operation loginVerify(. . . ). These additional actions are encapsulated
in RBAC aspect operations: CreateRoleSession(. . . ), AssignRoles(. . . ), and AssignRights(. . . ). Therefore, in
the woven design (Fig. 12), a line with an arrow is used to “connect” the operation loginVerify(. . . ) and those
three aspect operations. This has indicated a crosscutting relationship between a UML base operation and aspect
operations, and the texts “<<after>>” and “execution” describe two attributes of the crosscutting relationship,
which means that after the execution of the operation loginVerify(. . . ), the system should perform additional actions:
CreateRoleSession(. . . ), AssignRoles(. . . ), and AssignRights(. . . ). The rest of crosscutting relationship happens
between the operation execute(. . . ) of the Command component and the aspect operationCheckRolesForActions().
The texts “<<before>>” and “execution” indicate that with the RBAC aspect, before the execution of execute(),
the system needs to verify the user’s roles using the aspect operation CheckRolesForActions(). As all actions are
inherited from the Command component, this shows that before each action can be taken, the user’s role need to be
verified. The design presented in Fig. 12 is the graphical presentation of FDAF UML extension to support aspect
weaving. The meaning of the weaving is formally defined with aspect modeling elements proposed by this extension.
These aspect modeling elements include Joinpoint, Pointcuts, Crosscutting relationship etc. They are abstractions of
aspect-oriented programming concepts at the design level. A detailed description of FDAF aspect weaving and the
aspect modeling elements’ syntax and semantics are available in [10].
5. Discussion
This section presents the experience obtained from the empirical study of building RBAC into the architecture for
the online banking system:
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(1) Does FDAF security aspect help architects build RBAC security into a system, thus to bridge the gap between
system architects and security professional? Is the RBAC security aspect definition adequate?
Our empirical study showed that it is possible to make security capabilities as reusable aspects. However, here
“reusable” does not mean that the aspect can be used without any assumptions and customization, but rather serving
as a guidance of what a system should do in order to realize the desired security capabilities. For the instance of the
RBAC aspect and the online banking system, in the architecture design of the first phase, we implemented each action
as an individual class that was derived off of a base class (the Command component), and the RBAC aspect would
check upon execution of any sub-class of this base class to see if the target object was allowed or restricted based
upon the RBAC set-up. If the same template were followed for a new application, the aspect we designed could be
made generic. However, we also found out that if we were to have created an architecture design where the actions
were grouped into sets, such as User actions, Administrator actions, and Account Manager actions, where each set of
actions were in one class and each individual action were implemented as a method in its corresponding class, then
the original design for core application would need to be changed in order to realize the RBAC feature. Hence, we
have realized a refinement of the RBAC aspect definition is necessary. An attribute called “Assumption” for the aspect
may facilitate the application of the aspect, where the attribute can be used to document related assumptions about the
system. We have also found out FDAF aspect provides guidance on what security operations are needed in a system,
however, the definition could not provide the detailed implementation for each of these security operations, as the
detailed implementation is tied to each application’s security requirements.
(2) Does building RBAC security into the software architecture help to meet an enterprise’s security requirements?
In this study, we have demonstrated part of the refinement of (a) enterprise level security requirements into software
level RBAC security requirements and (b) the subsequent refinement and inclusion of RBAC aspects into the software
architecture. Based on this, we claim that part of the enterprise level security requirements has been met. If the example
is broadened to include additional security enterprise and software requirements, then the architecture could also be
extended and we could claim that more of the enterprise level security requirements have been met. However, this
approach represents the technical issues involved meeting the enterprise level requirements with automated workflows.
The manual workflows also need to be considered. Therefore, building security into the software architecture can help
to meet an enterprise’s security requirements, but it does not mean that the enterprise requirement are guaranteed to
be 100% met, since there are numerous other factors involved.
(3) Limitations of the UML business modeling extension
In comparison with other goal modeling approaches (e.g., NFR Framework, KAOS), the UML Business Modeling
Extension only supports a subset of the concepts. AND decompositions are supported in the goal/problem diagram, but
OR decompositions are not; this needs to be added to allow investigation of alternatives among sub-goals. Conflicting
or synergistic relationships among the goals cannot be readily presented on the diagram; nor can the rationale for a
goal or possible solutions for achieving the goal.
6. Related work
Approaches have been proposed in the literature that support a goal-oriented approach to modeling and analyzing
goals including the NFR Framework [5], KAOS [12] and Tropos [16]. The NFR Framework [5] focuses on the
elicitation, modeling, and analysis of softgoals (non-functional) rather than hardgoals (functional). Softgoals are
distinguished from hardgoals in that they can be “satisficed” (met in a good enough sense) rather than totally achieved.
For non-functional goals, this style of reasoning is appropriate, as meeting them is often a matter of degree, rather
than a true or false decision. The NFR Framework uses a visual modeling notation called the softgoal interdependency
graph (SIG). The atomic elements of a SIG include three kinds of goals: softgoals, operationalizations (i.e., possible
solutions), and claims (i.e., rationale or justification). These goals may be augmented with topics (relationships to
other elements including functional goals, agents, etc.) and prioritizations.
The approach is a goal-oriented approach, supports multiple levels of refinement, and has both AND/OR
decompositions. The NFR Framework has strong support for modeling and analyzing non-functional goals (e.g.,
security), but limited support for functional requirements. The KAOS [12] methodology approach consists of a
formal framework based on temporal logic and AI refinement techniques for goal-driven requirements elaboration.
The KAOS language provides a rich ontology for capturing requirements in terms of goals, constraints, objects,
actions, agents, etc. It defines four visual models: goal models, agent models, operation models, and object models. A
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goal model specifies goals (functional or non-functional), which the system should achieve. An agent model assigns
goals to agents, where an agent is a system component, e.g., an automated component or a human. The agent is
responsible for ensuring the achievement of their goals. An operation model specifies the operations that the agents
must perform to achieve the goals expressed in the goal model. An object model identifies the objects that are used in
the KAOSmodel. An object may be an entity (something that cannot perform operations), an agent (something that can
perform operations), or a relationship between objects. The approach has both AND/OR decompositions and support
functional and non-functional goal modeling and analysis, but limited support for multiple levels of refinement. The
Tropos [16] software development methodology is an agent-oriented approach that integrates ideas from multi-agent
system technologies and ideas from the requirements engineering community on early requirements analysis. The
Tropos methodology covers five development activities and the management of the traceability relationships: early
requirements analysis, late requirements analysis, architectural design, detailed design, and implementation. The early
requirements analysis is concerned with the understanding of a problem by studying an existing organizational setting.
During the early requirement analysis, the engineer models the set of desires and intentions informally expressed by
the stakeholders in terms of goals and dependencies between actors. This is an iterative process at each step of which
details are incrementally added and rearranged starting from a rough version of the model containing only few actors,
goals, softgoals, and dependencies. The approach supports goal modeling and supports multiple levels of refinement.
Approaches in the literature have been proposed that consider the relationships between goals and use cases [6,8,25,
33], and the relationships between requirement models and software architectures [17,24,27]. The approach presented
in [8] integrates functional and non-functional visual goal models into the RUP. An Enhanced Vision Document
is described which provides visual models for the functional and non-functional goals of the system in addition to
the traditional textual descriptions. The functional goals are presented with AND/OR Graphs; non-functional goals
are presented with Softgoal Interdependency Graphs. The Enhanced Vision Document is organized to capture the
answers to a rich collection of who, what, why, and how questions, with intuitive visual representations in addition
to the textual representations, which can provide more detail. The approach in [25] focuses on how to combine
goal and scenario based requirements elicitation technique with use case-driven analysis using natural language
concepts. In the proposed approach, four levels of goals, scenario authoring rules, and linguistic techniques have
been developed to identify use cases from text based goal and scenario descriptions. The artifacts resulting from
the approach could be used as input to a use case diagramming tool to automate the process of use case diagram
generation. In [17], the gap between requirements and software architecture has been analyzed and a feature-oriented
mapping and transformation approach is proposed. The solution to the gap is to take feature-oriented as a paradigm
both in requirements engineering and software architecting, so as to maintain direct and natural mapping between
requirements specification and software architecture. A lightweight approach, CBSP, intended to provide a systematic
way of reconciling requirements and architectures using intermediate models is presented in [24]. The approach
leverages a simple set of architectural concepts (components, connectors, overall systems, and their properties) to
recast and refine the requirements into an intermediate model facilitating their mapping to architectures.
7. Conclusion
Achieving enterprise level requirements (functional and non-functional) involves multiple levels of refinement.
Enterprise goals can be realized with automated or manual workflows; automated workflows can be achieved by
building, outsourcing, or buying software systems. For those going to be built, the software requirements (functional
and non-functional) are realized by the software architecture.
The paper presents building Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) security into the software architecture for an
online banking system using the Formal Design Analysis framework (FDAF). FDAF is a suitable design framework
for this problem, as it is aspect-oriented and provides a repository of predefined reusable security aspects to use.
FDAF also developed a UML extension to support aspect modeling. The aspects are derived from established security
patterns, which are developed by security experts. The architecture is developed in two phases: in the first phase,
an online banking system without RBAC was designed using the client server style; in the second phase, the RBAC
aspect was woven into the software architecture created in the first phase.
We also used the study to evaluate the possibility of making security properties as reusable aspects. Our experience
showed that it is feasible; however, we also found out that in order to reuse security aspects, certain assumptions about
the system are necessary. For the example of the online banking system and RBAC aspect, there is an assumption
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about how the permissions of the system are organized in order to meet a system’s security requirements. In turn,
meeting the system’s security requirements helps to meet the enterprise level security requirements.
There are interesting directions for the future work. The first is to investigate extending FDAF to provide an aspect-
oriented approach for modeling and analyzing enterprise and system level requirements, and their relationships to
software architectures. This extension would provide a more comprehensive aspect-oriented modeling and analysis
approach, encompassing the major activities in the early phases of software development. Additional security aspects
and their interactions need to be investigated for modeling and analysis in both the enterprise and software models;
the UML Business Process Modeling extension needs to be extended to support a richer set of synergistic and
conflicting relationships, such as those available in the NFR Framework. This is expected to be an interesting and
challenging problem, as it necessitates a measurement, either quantitative or qualitative, of security capabilities (e.g.,
one encryption algorithm is in some way better or worse than another and by how much).
Appendix. Example of a textual description for a use case (Update Customer Data for Bank Account Use Case)
Title: Update Customer Data for Bank Account
Overview: This use case provides the capability to update the customer data stored for a bank account that is active.
Actors: Account user (Customer, Bank Service Representative, and Bank Manager)
Pre-conditions: The account user is logged on (account user is authenticated)
Normal flow of events:
1. If a Customer requests to update their customer data and the account is active, then the online banking system shall
display a form with their:
a. Name (first, middle, last)
b. Address (unit, street, city, state, zip code)
c. Phone number (area code, number)
The customer can only updated their own customer data.
2. If a Bank Service Representative or Bank Manager requests to update the customer data for an account and the
account is active, then the online banking system shall display a form with the customer’s:
a. Name (first, middle, last)
b. Address (unit, street, city, state, zip code)
c. Phone number (area code, number)
3. The account user can edit any field displayed in the form.
4. If the account user requests to save the customer data, then the online banking system shall display a message
indicating the save has been completed.
5. If the account user sends a request to cancel the edit, then the online banking system shall display a message
indicating the editing has been cancelled.
Alternate flow of events
1. If a Customer tries to update the customer data for an account that isn’t active, then the online banking system shall
display a message indicating the customer data cannot be updated. This is an access violation.
2. If a Bank Service Representative or Bank Manager tries to update the customer data for an account that isn’t active,
then the online banking system shall display a message indicating the customer data cannot be updated. This is an
access violation.
3. If an Account User requests to update the customer data for an account that doesn’t exist, then the online banking
system shall display a message indicating the account does not exist
4. If a request to save the customer data is not successful, then the online banking system shall display a message
indicating the save was not successful.
Special requirements
6. Online banking system is a web based application
7. Every online banking transaction request is logged
8. Every access violation is logged
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9. The Customer Data are stored in a relational database
10. The logged events are stored in a separate relational database; the log data are encrypted for privacy Post-
conditions: If the customer data are successfully saved, then the customer data are updated in persistent storage.
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